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Defamation
23.1 The Court of Appeal decision in Chan Cheng Wah v Koh Sin
Chong Freddie and another appeal [2012] 1 SLR 506 ("Chan Cheng
Wah (CA)") concerned the nature of defamatory meaning and the
defences of justification and qualified privilege. The dispute arose
from two allegedly defamatory statements published in the minutes
of meeting of a management committee of a club ("current MC")
concerning the actions of the previous management committee
("previous MC"). Four members of the previous MC sued the
defendant, the president of the current MC, in respect of the statements.
23.2 The two statements related to the installation of a water system
after it was found that the pool at the club was contaminated. This
expenditure was not provided for in the club's annual budget.
Nonetheless, the club's financial operating manual stipulated that a
sitting management committee ("MC") may approve such expenditures
on an "emergency" basis and seek ratification of the expenditure at the
next AGM. The previous MC proceeded to approve the installation of
the water system and the expenditure was ratified at the subsequent
AGM. Later, the club's treasurer found documents that contained
information inconsistent with the representations made by the previous
MC at that AGM. An audit committee ("Audit Committee") that was
established by the current MC to review the project submitted an audit
report that the expenditure was of an emergency nature and that there
was no breach of any club procedures.
23.3 The defendant suggested at a meeting of the current MC that it
should correct the misrepresentation of fact made by the previous MC
to influence the ratification of expenditure at the last AGM ("First
Statement"). At a subsequent meeting, the defendant summarised the
treasurer's findings and stated, inter alia, that the capital expenditure
spent to install the system without budget approval was "unwarranted"
and that "it could be a case of misrepresentation of facts to the AGM to
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get ratification for a capital expenditure for a water system that
could not be justified under the urgent/emergency reason" ("Second
Statement").
23.4 The trial judge found the First Statement and Second Statement
("Statements") to be defamatory in that they meant that the plaintiffs
had intentionally misrepresented to club members that it was necessary
to replace the water filtration system on the basis it was a matter
of urgency and/or emergency, thus justifying the expenditure and
ratification by the AGM. However, the trial judge determined that the
defendant had justified the gist of the defamatory sting as the plaintiffs
had made the Statements to the club members despite knowing they
were untrue. The plaintiffs appealed against the judge's finding on
justification and costs, whilst the defendant appealed against the judge's
findings that the words complained of were defamatory.
23.5 The plaintiffs' appeal was allowed, but the defendant's appeal
was dismissed. First, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge on
defamatory meaning. It decided that the Statements by the defendant
suggested dishonesty and misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs when
they sought ratification of the expenditure at the AGM. The Court of
Appeal rejected the defendant's argument that the Statements only
meant that the plaintiffs had made erroneous representations and not
that they had deliberately made them to deceive club members.
23.6 The Court of Appeal observed that the First Statement was
made at a meeting where "suspicions of wrong-doing had clearly been
cast" on the previous MC in respect of the water system and that the
defendant was "obviously seeking to find fault" with the previous MC.
As for the Second Statement, the defendant gave his "own take" on the
treasurer's findings by describing them as a "case of misrepresenting of
facts to the AGM" to obtain ratification of the expenditure at the AGM.
The Second Statement also indicated that the defendant suspected the
previous MC of wrong-doing and was prepared to report them to the
relevant authorities if evidence was found.
23.7 The Court of Appeal confirmed the trial judge's view (Chan
Cheng Wah Bernard v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2010] SGHC 324) that as
the statements were contained in the minutes of the club's MC meetings
and published primarily to club members, the third party here would be
the "ordinary reasonable and interested Club member possessing
general knowledge of the affairs of the Club": Chan Cheng Wah (CA)
at [19] and [26]. The dispute over the expenditure of the new water
system was "widely-publicised and hotly-debated" within the club for a
period of at least half a year from the AGM to the two meetings in
which the defamatory statements were made. The background facts
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should therefore form part of the general knowledge of the reasonably
interested member.
23.8 The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed with the trial judge on
the defence of justification. The defamatory sting of the Statements was
that the previous MC had deliberately misrepresented the circumstances
relating to the expenditure with the aim of deceiving the club members
to ratify the expenditure. In this regard, the Court of Appeal found that
the plaintiffs did not have an intention to misrepresent or a dishonest
motive to influence the ratification of the expenditure. In fact, the
defendant had admitted that he did not have any basis for saying that
the plaintiffs deliberately made the misrepresentation with a view to
deceiving the members at the AGM. Hence, the defamatory sting in the
Statements was not justified.
23.9 The Court of Appeal stated that the Statements were made on
an occasion of qualified privilege as the MC of the club had a duty to
inform the club members of the misrepresentations made to them to
influence their ratification of the expenditure. However, it should be
highlighted that the defence of qualified privilege will not arise unless it
is also found that the recipients have a corresponding interest or duty to
receive the defamatory communication (Seaga v Harper [2009] 1 AC 1),
a requirement which the Court of Appeal did not specifically apply to
the facts. Nevertheless, on the facts of the present case, it should not be
difficult to find an interest on the part of the club members to receive
such communication.
23.10 In any event, the Court of Appeal decided that the protection
of privilege was lost due to malice. Malice may be proven by (a) the
defendant's knowledge of falsity, recklessness or lack of belief in the
defamatory statement; and (b) where the defendant has a genuine or
honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, but his dominant
motive is to injure the plaintiff or he has some other improper motive
(see Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin ]ian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331).
23.11 There was doubt whether the defendant had a genuine or
honest belief in the truth of the Statements. As the defendant
acknowledged in cross-examination that, as at the time of the
publication of the Statements, he had not formed an opinion as to
whether or not the plaintiffs had made the misrepresentations
deliberately, this implied, according to the Court of Appeal, "at the
minimum", a "reckless disregard for the truth": Chan Cheng Wah (CA)
at [91]. The Court of Appeal also noted (Chan Cheng Wah (CA)
at [92]-[95]) the following evidence: repeated insinuations by the
defendant about the plaintiffs' wrong-doing prior to the publication of
the defamatory statements, the defendant's statement at the time of
making the defamatory Second Statement that the "irregularities" in the
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"contract award and payments" ought to be reported to the relevant
authorities, the defendant's actions in embarking on a "witch-hunt"
against the plaintiffs by conducting investigations into the expenditure,
and repeatedly imploring the Audit Committee to amend the audit
report, despite the Audit Committee's repeated refusal to do so, and the
repeated attempts by the defendant formally to censure the plaintiffs
after the club members voted not to ratify the expenditure. Based on the
above evidence, the Court of Appeal found that the defendant's
dominant motive for publishing the Statements was to injure the
plaintiffs and that the defendant was determined to "soil the reputation"
of the plaintiffs in the eyes of the members of the club: Chan Cheng
Wah (CA) at [96].
23.12 In Kesavan Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd v S P Powerassets
Limited [2011] SGDC 179 ("Kesavan Engineering"), the central issues
were whether there had been "publication" of the impugned material
and whether the defamation action constituted an abuse of process.
A dispute relating to a breach of contract arose between the plaintiff
company and the defendant company. The letter addressed to the
plaintiff was sent by the defendant to three employees and one director
of the plaintiff company and no one else. The defendant argued that the
action should be struck out on two grounds: (a) the letter was not
published; and (b) abuse of process.
23.13 On the first ground, the defendant argued that the four persons
who read the letter did so firstly as employees or as a director of the
plaintiff company and secondly, they read the letter "in the ordinary
course of business" as such persons of the plaintiff company. The
district judge was faced with two "diametrically opposite" decisions on
the issue of publication, namely:
(a) State Bank of New South Wales v Currabubula Holdings
[2001] NSWCA 47 ("Currabubula") in which the Court of
Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held
(Currabubula at [129]) that "a communication to a company
which, because the company can only act by natural persons, is
received by someone on behalf of the company in the ordinary
course of business, is communication only to the company and
does not constitute publication. This is not confined to receipt
of the communication by the company's managing director and
alter ego, but includes receipt by any employee receiving the
communication on behalf of the company"; and
(b) Traztand Pty Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New
South Wales (1984) 2 NSWLR 598 ("Traztand") which stated
(Traztand at 600) that "... a publication defamatory of and
concerning a company made only to a servant or agent of that
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company constitutes a sufficient publication of that statement
in law".
23.14 The district judge decided that, unlike natural persons,
a corporation can only act through human agents. Hence, the receipt by
such human agents of allegedly defamatory material cannot logically
amount to anything other than the communication of the material to
the company itself. The apparent contradiction between the cases of
Traztand and Currabubula is reconcilable, according to the district
judge, in that "communication to an employee of defamatory material
can amount to publication if such communication could result in
employees losing confidence in the company": Kesavan Engineering
at [29]; citing Gatley on Libel (Sweet & Maxwell, 11th Ed, 2010) at p 172,
n 73. The district judge also suggested that the communication in
Traztand, unlike in the instant case, was not received by the two
employees as representatives of Traztand, but as individuals who
received "damaging news" of the company for whom they worked. In
the instant case, the judge stated that it was "unlikely that any employee
or director of the plaintiff would view a letter of demand as anything
other than a business dispute rather than [sic] something reflective of its
business or financial standing": Kesavan Engineering at [29]. Hence,
there was no publication of the letter in the present case.
23.15 Whilst one can appreciate the above distinction between the
cases observed by the district judge, it should be pointed out that the
court in Traztand was in fact referring to an "illustration" (as opposed to
the actual facts of the case) to show how a publication to a servant or
agent of a company may produce "substantial damage". The court stated
(Traztand at 600):
Let us imagine that there are employees of the Government Insurance
Office itself who think highly of their employer. A statement made to
such employees which was highly critical of that august body (not
entirely an unknown circumstance in the past) could cause those
employees to think the less of their employer. To suggest that there has
not been a publication in law in such circumstances would make a
mockery of the law of defamation.
23.16 The second ground for striking out the action was based on the
English decision of Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946
("Jameel") that publication of defamatory material that did not result in
a real and substantial tort may be struck out as an abuse of the court
process. In Jameel, only five people read the impugned article that was
posted on an internet site. In the instant case, the publication of the
impugned material to three employees of the plaintiff company and one
of its directors did not, according to the district judge, amount to
anything substantial. The alleged defamatory publication was merely a
letter of demand complaining of breach of contract on the part of the
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plaintiff in connection with a contract between plaintiff and defendant.
Thus, the action should be struck out.
23.17 Whilst the case of Jameel has been referred to in prior local
decisions (Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007]
2 SLR(R) 453 at [29]; Ng Koo Kay Benedict v Zim Integrated Shipping
Services Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 860 at [44]), this is, to our best knowledge, the
first time that a Singapore court has struck out a defamation action
based on the doctrine of abuse of process in Jameel.
Economic torts
23.18 In The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd (trading as Stansfield College) v
Consumers' Association of Singapore [2011] 4 SLR 130 ("Stansfield"), the
main tort issues related to inducement of breach of contract and
negligence. The first plaintiff owned Stansfield and SIC, two private
educational organisations ("PEOs") offering tertiary education to local
and foreign students. Subsequently, the first plaintiff transferred SIC to
the second plaintiff, and Stansfield to one of its subsidiary companies.
The first defendant, Consumers' Association of Singapore ("CASE"),
administered an accreditation scheme for private education businesses
(or CaseTrust for Education: "CaseTrust"). All PEOs in Singapore which
enrolled foreign students required a valid CaseTrust membership. To
obtain the membership, PEOs had to satisfy a student protection
scheme designed to protect foreign students from losing tuition fees
paid to a PEO due to insolvency or premature closing of such PEO. To
participate in the scheme, the plaintiffs chose the option of taking out
an insurance policy for at least 70% of the tuition fees and applied to the
second defendant, NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Limited
("Income"), for insurance cover. Income issued master insurance
policies for both Stansfield and SIC. Stansfield and SIC thus became
accredited members of CaseTrust.
23.19 Due to market talk regarding the plaintiff's poor financial
status, CASE conducted investigations on the schools and informed
Income about this. It transpired that the plaintiffs had not insured the
students. Later, Income froze the plaintiffs' insurance facilities pending
CASE's investigation. CASE wrote to Stansfield and SIC about the
discrepancy and asked for an explanation. The discrepancy was an
administrative oversight on the plaintiffs' part which was explained to
CASE. However, CASE did not accept the explanation and suspended
the plaintiffs' membership.
23.20 The plaintiffs claimed against CASE for damages and a
declaration that the suspension of membership was unlawful and void.
It also claimed damages against Income. Apart from the allegation that
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CASE had breached the contractual duties under the CASE-PEO
agreement and the code of practice for CaseTrust members ("Code of
Practice"), the plaintiffs claimed in tort against CASE. The tort claims
were that CASE had wrongfully and recklessly induced and procured the
breach by Income of its obligations to the plaintiffs; unlawfully
interfered with the contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and
Income and/or hindered the performance by Income of its obligations
to the plaintiffs; negligently failed to investigate the matters; failed to
give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to deal with its concerns
with respect to the plaintiffs' membership.
23.21 All claims against CASE were dismissed. This case summary
focuses on the tortious claims. Firstly, though CASE acted with the
requisite knowledge of the existence of the contract between the
plaintiffs and Income, the plaintiffs did not show that CASE intended to
interfere with the plaintiffs' contractual rights: see Zim Integrated
Shipping Services Ltd v Dafni Igal [2010] 2 SLR 426. Hence, CASE
did not wrongfully and recklessly induce a breach by Income of its
obligations to the plaintiffs. Secondly, CASE did not owe a duty of care
to the plaintiffs not to act in a manner that would adversely affect the
contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and Income and to
administer CaseTrust in such a manner so as not to cause loss or
damage to the plaintiffs. Though it was reasonably foreseeable that a
revocation or suspension of the schools' membership in CaseTrust could
result in loss to the plaintiffs, the contractual relationship between the
plaintiffs and CASE was not sufficiently proximate for the imposition of
the alleged duties in tort. In this regard, Judith Prakash J observed that
the CASE-PEO agreement or the Code of Practice did not expressly
impose such duties on CASE. Moreover, the duties sought to be
imposed are contrary to any attempt by CASE properly to carry out its
duties as the administrator of CaseTrust. The learned judge explained
(Stansfield at [161]):
CASE's role is to administer a scheme intended to benefit third parties
(ie, foreign students) and to take all necessary action to ensure that
that scheme is properly implemented and adhered to by all CaseTrust
members. To impose a duty on an administrator not to act in
a manner detrimental to its members, no matter what the
circumstances, would be contrary to its duty to the third parties and
also to its responsibilities as administrator. The interests of the third
parties and those of the members are not always aligned. Here CASE's
duty is to act primarily in the interests of foreign students as the same
are embodied in the Scheme and, if to do so means that CASE has to
act against the interests of a member, then CASE would have to choose
the interests of the students over those of the member.
23.22 In any event, there were no policy considerations why such
duties should be imposed on CASE. Prakash J commented on the
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significance of the existing contractual framework on the question of
duty of care (Stansfield at [162]):
The terms of the CASE-PEO agreements, the Code of Practice and the
Info-Kit were drafted to achieve a certain purpose and I cannot graft
onto those terms any duties that would undermine them or have the
effect of changing the relationship and responsibilities of the schools
with, and to, CASE. The documents already contain terms for the
protection of the interests of the schools (for example cl 10 of the
Code of Practice) and the courts should be slow to add to or modify
such terms.
23.23 Moving on to the claims by the plaintiffs against Income in tort,
it was alleged that Income had wrongfully and recklessly procured the
breach by CASE of the CASE-PEO agreement or alternatively that
Income had unlawfully interfered with the contractual relationship
between the plaintiffs and CASE and that Income breached its duty of
care to the plaintiffs to ensure that it acted reasonably in administering
the insurance facilities so as not to cause loss or damage to the plaintiffs.
23.24 The learned judge found that firstly, Income did not wrongfully
and recklessly induce CASE to breach its contractual obligations to the
plaintiffs. There was no breach of CASE's contractual obligations to the
plaintiffs to begin with. Further, there was no element of pressure,
persuasion or procurement on the part of Income directed towards
CASE's contractual relations with the first plaintiff. Income merely
communicated information to CASE regarding its decision to suspend
its facilities to the schools and this did not constitute an inducement to
procure a breach of contract.
23.25 Secondly, Income did not owe the plaintiffs any duty to act
reasonably in administering the policies so as not to cause loss or
damage to the plaintiffs. Prakash J could not find any express or implied
duties in the policies. Moreover, such a duty would conflict with the
express rights given to Income unilaterally to withdraw the maximum
insurable limits under the policies. No duty of good faith in insurance
contracts exists that would have imposed an obligation on Income to act
fairly in deciding whether or not to suspend the policies. There is also
no case authority for the proposition that the insurer owes a duty of
care to the insured to act reasonably in administering the policy or
insurance facility.
23.26 The appeal by Stansfield and SIC to the Court of Appeal was
dismissed on 18 October 2011 with costs awarded to CASE and Income.
23.27 In Walton International Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Loh Pui-Pui
Sharon [2011] SGHC 145, the plaintiff company summarily terminated
the employment of the defendant (former vice-president, sales) and
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sued her for breach of her employment contract, breach of her fiduciary
duty owed to the company and for unlawful interference with its trade.
23.28 The plaintiff company pleaded that the defendant failed to
furnish useful information to the company. In another suit by the
plaintiff group of companies against two of its former senior executives,
the defendant was accused of furthering the intentions of the two
former executives and acting against the company's interests,
notwithstanding the defendant was not a party to that suit. As the
plaintiff group of companies failed to prove that the two executives
committed the alleged unlawful acts against it, Tan Lee Meng J stated
that the defendant was not culpable for refusing to assist by giving
information on those acts. The learned judge also found that the
defendant did not breach her employment contract as alleged by the
plaintiff. Even if she had been in breach, the plaintiff had suffered no
loss as a result.
23.29 Finally, there was no objective evidence as to the reasons why
the defendant, who was earning a high income per annum, would desire
to sabotage the plaintiff by interfering with its trade as this would
adversely affect her own interests. As such, the plaintiff did not establish
that the defendant had unlawfully interfered with its trade.
Misrepresentation (fraudulent/negligent)
23.30 Chan Pui Woo Teresa v Ng Fook Khau Michael [2011] SGHC 65
concerned a plaintiff who was the victim of fraud. The second
defendant, a colleague of the plaintiff, had introduced the first
defendant to the plaintiff. The first defendant claimed that he had
US$45.8m in an account in London, which could be retrieved after
payment of tax. The plaintiff was persuaded to advance S$150,000 for a
promised 100% return on her investment. The second defendant
prepared the agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant.
Sometime later, the second defendant came back to the plaintiff asking
for a further US$380,000 to pay the outstanding tax. The plaintiff
advanced this sum under a second agreement prepared by the second
defendant. This was followed by a third agreement for a smaller sum.
The first defendant then claimed that his assets had been transferred to
a Swiss account following intervention by the Nigerian government,
and he now needed to pay a European Union tax of close to US$lm.
Investigations by the Commercial Affairs Department revealed that the
first defendant was part of a scam.
23.31 The plaintiff sued the first defendant and obtained an
interlocutory order. She then brought actions for both fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation against the second defendant. The trial
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judge, Lai Siu Chiu J, found that the second defendant had himself been
a victim of the fraud and that he had not acted dishonestly in his
dealings with the plaintiff. The claim for fraudulent misrepresentation
was dismissed. On the negligent misrepresentation action, the key
questions were whether the second defendant had assumed
responsibility for his representations and whether the plaintiff had
reasonably relied on those representations. From the evidence, Lai J
found that the plaintiff had not relied on the second defendant, and had
in fact been in control of her relationship with the first defendant, with
the second defendant merely acting as the first defendant's lawyer in
preparing the agreements. It was apparent that the second defendant
had not assumed responsibility and the plaintiff had not relied on the
second defendant. There was thus no proximity between the two that
could have given rise to a duty of care.
Negligence
General
23.32 Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2757 v Lee Mow
Woo (practising under the firm of Engineers Partnership) [2011]
SGHC 112 was a defective building case, which on the face of it seems
unremarkable, but on closer examination raises an important point. The
plaintiff was the management corporation of an industrial development
made up of three blocks, which were subdivided into 545 subsidiary
units. The defendant was a consultant engineer who had carried out
the design for the development. The plaintiff brought an action in
negligence for the rectification costs arising out of various defects
relating to the expansion joints and surrounding areas, lift motor rooms
and mezzanine floors.
23.33 The parties reached a settlement on the motor rooms and
mezzanine floors, but the defendant denied breach of duty with respect
to the design of the joints and surrounding areas. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant's design did not meet the standards set out in the
British Standards Institution's Code of Practice ("Code"). Lee Seiu Kin J
rightly accepted the defendant's argument that the Code did not set the
common law standard. Lee J then considered the expert opinions
proffered by both parties, concluded that the design was inadequate and
held that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in negligence for the
cost of rectification.
23.34 What makes this case potentially significant is that it implicitly
recognised liability for negligently inflicted economic loss with respect
to a defective building that is commercial in nature. The orthodox
view is that the defective buildings cases should be confined to
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non-commercial properties. The Court of Appeal in Man B&W Diesel
SE Asia Pte Ltd v PT Bumi International Tankers [2004] 2 SLR(R) 300,
while declining to make an explicit ruling on whether commercial
properties came within the defective buildings principle affirmed in
RSP Architects Planners & Engineers v Ocean Front Pte Ltd [1995]
3 SLR(R) 653 ("Ocean Front") and RSP Architects Planners & Engineers
(Raglan Squire & Partners FE) v Management Corporation Strata Title
Plan No 1075 [1999] 2 SLR(R) 134 ("Eastern Lagoon"), made it clear
that the Ocean Front/Eastern Lagoon principle should be narrowly
interpreted. Similarly, the High Court of Australia has declined to
extend Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 to commercial properties
(Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515).
23.35 Xu Ren Li v Nakano Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 729 was
an appeal by a claimant who had suffered a work place injury and had
his claim dismissed in the District Court. The claimant had fallen down
a staircase while descending from the 19th floor of a building which was
still under construction. The claimant suffered minor injuries to his
shoulder and back, and sued his employer, alleging breaches of both a
statutory duty and a common law duty. The statutory duty was based on
rule 23(2) of the Workplace Safety and Health (General Provisions)
Regulations (Cap 354A, Rg 1, 2007 Rev Ed), which provided as follows:
23(2) For every staircase in a factory building or which affords a
means of exit from the factory building, a substantial handrail shall be
provided and maintained, which -
(a) If the staircase has an open side, shall be on that
side; and
(b) If the staircase has 2 open sides, shall be on both
sides.
23.36 In allowing the appeal, Chan Sek Keong CJ disagreed with the
district judge's interpretation of the regulation that it only required
provision of handrails where the staircase had at least one open side.
Chan CJ took a purposive approach and held that a handrail was
required even where the staircase had no open side, as the purpose of
the regulations was to provide for the safety of users of the staircase. On
the common law duty, Chan CJ accepted the claimant's argument that
the defendant had breached its duty to provide a safe place of work by
failing to provide a handrail, failing to maintain the staircase which had
uneven steps and failing to provide adequate lighting. Having found the
defendants liable, Chan CJ reduced the damages by 50% on account of
the claimant's contributory negligence in rushing down the staircase,
instead of descending carefully.
23.37 Arguably the most significant case on the duty of care test in
2011 was Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon
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Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146 ("Animal Concerns") where Andrew Phang Boon
Leong JA elaborated on the application of the Spandeck duty of care test
(Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency
[2007] 4 SLR(R) 100). The facts were that the appellant (plaintiff),
Animal Concerns Research & Education Society, had contracted with
AnA Contractor Pte Ltd ("AnN') to build a shelter for animals. The
respondent (defendant) was AnA's director who was appointed the clerk
of works to supervise the construction project. There were problems
with AnA's performance of the contract, resulting in the appellant suing
AnA for breach of contract and negligence. The appellant also sued the
respondent in the tort of negligence for failing to supervise AnA
properly. In particular, it was alleged that the respondent had been
negligent in failing to supervise the levelling of the site. AnA had used
wood chips as landfill, causing a foul smell, which required the appellant
to undertake rectification works.
23.38 The trial judge found that AnA had breached its contract and
AnA did not appeal against this. On the negligence claim against the
respondent, the trial judge referred to s 10(5) of the Building Control
Act (Cap 29, 1999 Rev Ed) which provided as follows:
10(5) Every site supervisor appointed under this section in respect
of any building works shall take all reasonable steps and exercise due
diligence in giving -
(a) in the case of large building works - full-time
supervision to the carrying out of the structural elements of
the building works; and
(b) in the case of small-scale building works -
immediate supervision to the carrying out of the critical
structural elements of the building works,
to ensure that the structural elements or critical structural elements, as
the case may be, of the building works in question are carried out in
accordance with the plans of the building works supplied to him in
accordance with section 9(1) (c) by a qualified person, and with any
terms and conditions imposed by the Commissioner of Building
Control.
23.39 The judge held that s 10(5) of the Building Control Act did not
impose a duty on the respondent as the earthworks and backfilling were
not part of the structural elements of the building. The appellant
appealed, arguing that s 10(5) did impose a duty and in addition, that
the respondent owed a common law duty under Spandeck. Phang JA,
delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, agreed with the trial
judge's finding on the duty question. Phang JA went on to distinguish
between the tort of breach of statutory duty and the common law tort
of negligence, holding that there was no liability in common law for
negligent performance of a statutory duty unless there was a common
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law duty or if the statute gave rise to a private cause of action. This point
has been discussed comprehensively by Margaret Fordham in a case
note (M Fordham, "The Duty of Care of a Clerk of Works - Spandeck
and Its Aftermath" [2011] Sing JLS 260).
23.40 On the common law duty of care, Phang JA reiterated the
unitary nature of the Spandeck test and its applicability to all cases of
negligence. The threshold question of foreseeability was easily satisfied,
as Phang JA held that it was foreseeable that the appellant could suffer
some harm, for example "subsidence and physical damage" if the
respondent were negligent. It is clear that the foreseeability inquiry is
not aimed at the general type of damage, namely economic loss, but at
any type of damage.
23.41 This is at odds with the Court of Appeal's approach in Man
Mohan Singh slo Jothirambal Singh v Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte
Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 735 ("Man Mohan") where the foreseeability
inquiry was directed at the type of loss, namely economic loss. If the
threshold foreseeability inquiry could be satisfied by foresight of any
type of loss as suggested in Animal Concerns, then in Man Mohan it
would have been foreseeable that parents of children who had suffered
an unexpected violent death in a motor accident could suffer some
harm, for example, psychiatric harm. The approach in the two cases
appears to be contradictory. Further, in both Ngiam Kong Seng v Lim
Chiew Hock [2008] 3 SLR(R) 674 and Man Mohan, the foreseeability
inquiry was based on what could be reasonably foreseen; this is a
normative, rather than factual inquiry. Indeed, even in Animal Concerns,
Phang JA reverts to the pre-Spandeck language of reasonable
foreseeability, rather than factual foreseeability. These ambiguities
surrounding the role of foreseeability in the Spandeck test could benefit
from further clarification.
23.42 Phang JA undertook a historical analysis of the role of the clerk
of works and concluded that the task of the clerk of works was to "assist
the architect by monitoring the work of contractors on behalf of the
person commissioning the construction works" (client). Following the
historical analysis, Phang JA surveyed the case law which provided
further support for the supervisory role of a clerk of works. Phang JA
concluded that there was a sufficient relationship of proximity between
the appellant and the respondent because the respondent had
voluntarily assumed responsibility and held himself out as having the
relevant qualifications and skills to supervise the building works.
Further, the appellant had clearly relied on the respondent and the
respondent knew that the appellant was so relying.
23.43 On the contractual matrix, Phang JA held that there was no
inconsistency between the contract between AnA and the appellant on
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the one hand and a duty of care owed by the respondent to the appellant
on the other. Thus, there were no policy reasons under the second limb
of the Spandeck test to negate the duty of care. Phang JA also clarified
that the contractual matrix was a matter that could be considered within
either the first or second limb of Spandeck, depending on the particular
circumstances. There was further clarification that the policy
considerations under Spandeck were not confined to negative factors,
but could, where relevant, consist of duty-affirming policy
considerations. Having found that the respondent owed a duty of care,
Phang JA held that the respondent had breached that duty by failing
properly to supervise the backfilling and failing to check whether
suitable materials had been used.
Economic loss
23.44 Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria CreditanstaltAG [2011] 4 SLR 559
("Go Dante") involved a claim by a client of a bank against the bank for
losses incurred as a result of investments that were adversely affected by
the Asian financial crisis in 1998. The appellant (plaintiff) had opened
two accounts with the respondent (defendant): a savings account in
Hong Kong and an investment account in Singapore. Both accounts
were managed by the same vice-president of the bank, and were subject
to a set of contractual terms which gave the respondent the power and
discretion to trade in securities on behalf of the appellant, subject to his
final authorisation. The respondent entered into 16 investments on
behalf of the appellant, three of which incurred significant losses as a
result of the Asian financial crisis.
23.45 The appellant sued the respondent, alleging that none of the
investments had been authorised ("Authorisation Claim"), and that the
respondent owed him duties in tort and contract which had been
breached, causing him loss ("Advisory Claim"). The trial judge found
against the appellant on both claims. On the Authorisation Claim, it was
found that the investments had in fact been authorised and on the
Advisory Claim it was held that there was no contractual or tortious
duty on the part of the respondent to give investment advice to the
appellant.
23.46 On appeal, the appellant dropped the Authorisation Claim
argument and focused on the Advisory Claim. Andrew Phang Boon
Leong JA, giving the judgment of the court, dismissed the appeal,
holding that while there was both a contractual and tortious duty,
neither was breached on the facts. In analysing the duty of care in tort,
Phang JA was critical of the framing of the duty of care as the duty to
advise, observing (Go Dante at [19]) that this was pitching the duty at so
specific a level that it "would render the question of breach nugatory, for
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the tortfeasor would ... be under a duty to do precisely that which he
has been accused of not doing ... and there would be no room for the
court to inquire whether it was in fact reasonable for him not to have
done it".
23.47 The proper question in Phang J's view was whether the
respondent owed a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in the
provision of professional services. The failure to advise or to provide
proper advice was a question that went to the breach of the professional
duty. Applying the Spandeck test, Phang JA held that it was clearly
foreseeable that the appellant would suffer loss if the respondent acted
negligently with respect to the account. On proximity, it was held that
the respondent had held itself out as having special skills and had
assumed responsibility by taking control of the appellant's assets. The
respondent also knew that the appellant would rely on the respondent
and in the circumstances the appellant had indeed relied on the
respondent.
23.48 However, one could take a different view of the facts and the
underlying law. The contractual agreement between the parties clearly
stipulated that the appellant would have the final say in any investments,
which could fairly give rise to the inference that the respondent had not
assumed responsibility and that the appellant had not relied on the
respondent. Phang JA also adverted to the fact that rather than being
a novice or a vulnerable claimant, the appellant in this case was
commercially experienced. This would normally militate against finding
a duty of care. Nevertheless, Phang JA held that these factors were
relevant to the standard of care rather than the duty of care. This seems
to go against the general trend in economic loss cases where the
vulnerability of the claimant and the relationship of the parties tended
to be relevant to the existence and scope of a duty of care (Man B&W
Diesel Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831, Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999)
198 CLR 180).
23.49 To support the argument that the commercial experience of the
claimant went to the standard of care rather than duty of care, Phang JA
stated (Go Dante at [37]):
After all, it was difficult to see why, taking a simple illustration,
a doctor would not owe his patient a duty to take care in treating him
simply because his patient was also a doctor.
Two points can be made here. First, the duty owed by a doctor to a
patient does not arise because of any particular assumption of
responsibility and reliance; the duty is based on the established
relationship of doctor and patient. The fact that the patient happens to
be a doctor is irrelevant. Secondly, where a doctor is treating a patient
who also happens to be a doctor, surely the standard of care remains the
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same, contrary to the court's view that the standard of care should be
lowered depending on the experience of the claimant.
23.50 There is an interesting phenomenon here which cannot be fully
explored in this forum, but recent Court of Appeal decisions suggest
that the court is increasingly using the standard of care rather than the
duty of care as a control device for imposing liability in negligence. In
addition to Go Dante, both Animal Concerns and Skandinaviska Enskilda
Banken AB (Publ) Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore)
Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR 367; [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 exemplify this approach,
with a preference for a variable standard of care that is based on factors
particular to the individual parties to the dispute. This harkens to the
debate on variable standards found in the inexperienced driver cases
such as Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691, Imbree v McNeilly (2008)
236 CLR 510 and Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376. While English and
Australian courts have experimented with, and resisted this approach,
Singapore may be seeing its renaissance. This approach may result in
more individualised justice, but at the same time may result in some loss
of predictability and efficiency.
23.51 In determining whether there was a breach of duty, the court
noted that the appellant knew the risks and was unlikely to have relied
on the respondent, and that the respondent would have been entitled to
have assumed that to be the case. This was bolstered by a contractual
clause whereby the respondent excluded liability except in cases of
"default, fraud or gross negligence". This suggests that the twin
requirements of voluntary assumption of responsibility and reasonable
reliance were absent, and it is a little puzzling that the court chose to
recognise a duty, but deny liability on the ground that the duty was not
breached. By shifting the inquiry from the scope of duty to breach of
duty, the court arguably sacrificed the gatekeeping function of the duty
of care, and may well see a surge in the number of disappointed
investors demanding to have their day in court.
Professional liability
23.52 D'Conceicao Jeanie Doris (administratrix of the estate of Milakov
Steven deceased) v Tong Ming Chuan [2011] SGHC 193 was a medical
negligence case brought by the wife of the deceased who died following
heart surgery. The deceased underwent triple coronary artery bypass
graft ("CABG") surgery on 19 January 2007. On 9 March 2007, the
deceased suffered a minor heart attack. The deceased saw his
cardiologist, who checked and found that two of three grafts had
become blocked. The deceased was referred to the defendant,
a cardiothoracic surgeon who proposed a redo-CABG. It was accepted
that a redo-CABG carried a higher risk than a CABG, especially if
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performed within a short space of time after the first surgery.
The deceased underwent the redo-CABG on 12 March, developed
post-operative complications and died on 23 April.
23.53 The claimant brought the action as administratix of the
deceased's estate for the benefit of herself and her two children as
dependants of the deceased. The allegations of negligence against the
defendant fell under three broad categories:
(a) The defendant had been negligent in recommending
that the deceased undergo the redo-CABG;
(b) The defendant had been negligent in failing to provide
information about the risk of redo-CABG as well as alternative
options; and
(c) The defendant had been negligent in the actual
performance of the surgery.
23.54 Tay Yong Kwang J reiterated that the test for medical negligence
in Singapore was that stated in Khoo James v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy
[2002] 1 SLR(R) 1024 ("Gunapathy"), which endorsed the English
approach as stated in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
[ 1957] 1 WLR 582 ("Bolam") and refined in Bolitho v City and Hackney
Health Authority [1998] AC 232. Applying this test, Tay J found against
the claimant on all the allegations of negligence. Tay J also considered
whether the doctor's duty to advise should be governed not by Bolam,
but by the Australian approach in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479
("Rogers"). Rogers had rejected the Bolam test and instead held that a
doctor would be negligent in failing to inform or advise a patient of a
material risk. A material risk, in most cases, would be that to which a
reasonable patient would attach significance.
23.55 Canada has a similar test and Malaysia has recently adopted
Rogers. The English courts, while retaining Bolam, have in some cases
demonstrated an approach that is closer to Rogers, which gives greater
weight to patient autonomy. The high water mark of the patient
autonomy approach in the UK was the case of Chester v Afshar [2005]
1 AC 134 ("Chester"), which Tay J held was not relevant to Singapore as
Chester might have been influenced by the Human Rights Act 1998
(c 42) (UK). However, it should be noted that Chester did not refer to
the Human Rights Act; the judges who championed patients' rights
referred to the common law, citing authorities from the Unites States,
Canada, England and Australia as well as academic writings. In
particular, the majority was highly influenced by the High Court of
Australia's decision in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, based on a
similar factual situation to Chester. While Tay J was entirely right in
holding that Gunapathy had clearly stated the law and bound the High
Court, the question of whether Bolam should continue to be the law of
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Singapore is something which the Court of Appeal should reconsider,
given the trend in major common law jurisdictions and the greater
recognition of individual rights that have gained traction in Singapore.
Employer's liability
23.56 Ren Feng Hai v Supersonic Maintenance Services Pte [2011]
SGDC 295 involved two claimants who had suffered a workplace injury
while dismantling a fan at the National University of Singapore
Students' ("NUSS") former clubhouse. The first claimant was a
technician employed by NUSS, and the second claimant was a cleaner
employed by Supersonics Maintenance Services Pte Ltd ("Supersonic"),
a company hired by NUSS to provide cleaning and dishwashing services.
Neither of the claimants was qualified to dismantle fans, and the task
was in fact supposed to have been handled by another properly qualified
technician employed by NUSS. However, the qualified technician
claimed that he had had to step out to answer a telephone call and in his
absence the two claimants had dismantled the fan. In the course of
dismantling the fan, it fell to the ground, dislodging both claimants
from their respective ladders. The first claimant sued NUSS and the
second claimant sued both NUSS and Supersonic. Both suits were
consolidated.
23.57 Loo Ngan Chor DJ found in favour of the claimants in both
actions. Loo DJ held that NUSS had breached its duty to provide a safe
system of work for its employees, including employees hired by its
contractor, Supersonic. NUSS had breached its duty by failing to
supervise, as evidenced by the absence of the qualified technician; by
failing to give clear instructions as to the tasks that employees should
and should not perform; by failing to provide proper safety equipment -
in this case, rather than ladders, a stable platform ought to have been
used for the dismantling process. Although the second claimant was
performing the task for NUSS under NUSS's supervision, Supersonic
was held liable as the second claimant's employer under the employer's
personal non-delegable duty. NUSS was held 100% liable to the first
claimant and 80% liable to the second claimant, with Supersonic being
20% liable for the second claimant. Loo DJ found that neither of the
claimants had negligently contributed to the accident.
23.58 Although not necessary to resolve the issue, Loo DJ also
considered whether the second claimant had been acting in the course
of employment when he dismantled the fan. Quoting extensively the
judgment of Tay Yong Kwang J in Pang Chew Kim v Wartsila Singapore
Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 15; [2011] SGHC 194 on what was within the
course of employment for the purposes of the Work Injury
Compensation Act (Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed), Loo DJ concluded that the
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second claimant had clearly been acting within the course of
employment.
Nuisance
23.59 Ho See Jui (trading as Xuanhua Art Gallery) v Liquid Advertising
Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 108 ("Ho See Jui") involved concurrent claims in
negligence, nuisance and the rule in John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v
Thomas Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 ("Rylands v Fletcher"). The
plaintiff was in the business of exhibiting and selling paintings at an art
gallery and was the tenant of the ground floor of a two-storey
shophouse. The first defendant was the tenant of the second-floor unit
located directly above the art gallery. The second defendant was the sole
local distributor of water dispensing units ("WDU") which it installed
and maintained at the first defendant's office pursuant to the
reinstallation agreement and maintenance contracts respectively. The
quotation for the reinstallation contained the following warning (Ho See
Jui at [5]):
**Pls [sic] note: the place where the water dispenser is installed should
have a floor trap, so that when there is a leak it will not flood the area.
We will not be held responsible for any damages [sic] resulting from
the leaking [sic] or flooding from the filter [sic] or water dispenser.
23.60 The maintenance contracts contained the following disclaimer
(Ho See Jui at [9]):
Please be informed that the installation of the water cooler and/or
water dispenser should be at a wet pantry area. [The second
defendant] will not be held responsible for any damages [sic] resulting
from flooding or leaking from the water filter and/or water cooler
and/or water dispenser or any damages [sic] from the installation or
repair or fault of the water cooler and/or water dispenser.
23.61 Subsequently, the water inlet hose carrying water to the WDU
ruptured and the water leaking from the inlet hose seeped through the
flooring of the first defendant's second floor unit into the art gallery.
The plaintiff alleged that the water that seeped into the art gallery
damaged his paintings and the cabinet storing his paintings.
23.62 The plaintiff claimed in negligence, nuisance and under the rule
in Rylands v Fletcher against the first defendant. With respect to the
second defendant, the claim was based on negligence and nuisance. The
first defendant sought contribution or indemnity from the second
defendant on the ground that the second defendant had breached
various implied terms of the reinstallation agreement and the
maintenance contracts.
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23.63 Lai Siu Chiu J observed that the water inlet hose had ruptured
due to a combination of factors: (a) hydrolysis (ie, process of
degradation when exposed to water); and (b) the helical seam lines on
the water inlet hose ("helical line feature"). However, both the helical
line feature and the hydrolytic degradation would not have been
discovered despite reasonable inspection.
23.64 With respect to the claim in nuisance, the learned judge found
both the first and second defendants liable. The learned judge stated (Ho
See Jui at [57] and [59]) that a single interference may be actionable
provided that the "state of affairs" at the property from which the
interference emanated was potentially hazardous (see Hygeian Medical
Supplies Pte Ltd v Tri-Star Rotary Screen Engraving Works Pte Ltd (Seng
Wing Engineering Works Pte Ltd third party) [1993] 2 SLR(R) 411
at [22]-[23] ("Hygeian Medical Supplies") and Clerk and Lindsell on
Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 2010) at para 20-16). With respect to
the potential hazardous "state of affairs", Lai J explained that (Ho See Jui
at [59]):
... the placement of the WDU at the WDU Area [('WDU Area')]was
potentially hazardous because any leakage from the WDU or the
Water Inlet Hose could result in seepage of water ... the Water Inlet
Hose ruptured due to a combination of the hydrolytic degradation
and the Helical Line Feature ... The hydrolytic degradation occurred
because the Water Inlet Hose was made of a material that was
unsuitable for the carriage of water ... Given those circumstances, the
use of the Water Inlet Hose with the WDU was a potential hazard. Put
simply, the rupturing of the Water Inlet Hose was an accident waiting
to happen.
23.65 The second defendant was responsible for the hydrolytic
degradation and the helical line feature and partially responsible for
installing the WDU at the WDU Area. The first defendant was only
responsible for instructing the second defendant to locate the WDU at
the WDU Area. In addition, the nuisance was reasonably foreseeable to
both defendants. A reasonable person would have known that locating a
WDU at the WDU Area could result in seepage of water into the art
gallery because of the nature of the flooring at the WDU Area and
would have also taken heed of the quotation warning and the disclaimer
which warned that it was not safe to locate a WDU at the WDU Area.
A reasonable person in the position of the first defendant would have
realised that directing an independent contractor to install a WDU at
the WDU Area might result in the nuisance. As for the second
defendant, he would also have foreseen the possibility of the nuisance
for the same reason and would have taken heed on his own warnings in
the quotation warning and the disclaimer.
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23.66 Apart from nuisance, the first defendant was also liable in
negligence. The first defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care
according to the test outlined in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v
Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 ("Spandeck").
First, the threshold requirement of factual foreseeability was satisfied as
the first defendant could have reasonably foreseen that its instruction to
the second defendant to locate the WDU at the WDU Area could
damage the plaintiff's property. In this regard, Lai J opined that the
"same analysis" relating to the reasonable foreseeability of the nuisance
(see para 23.65 above) should also apply to the threshold of factual
foreseeability in duty of care. With respect, reasonable foreseeability
of the nuisance focuses on the foreseeability of the type of damage
(ie, remoteness of damage) and the quantification of damages, and this
is conceptually distinct from factual foreseeability of damage in general
under duty of care and the determination of liability (as opposed to
quantum).
23.67 Secondly, there was sufficient proximity between the plaintiff
and the first defendant based on physical proximity and reliance. The
learned judge stated that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the
first defendant to take reasonable measures to avoid the seepage of
water. The first defendant should also have known that the plaintiff
would rely on it to take such measures given their close physical
proximity and the permeability of the flooring at the WDU Area to
water (on duty of care between neighbours, see PC Connect Pte Ltd v
HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd (trustee of CapitaMall
Trust) (Bachmann Japanese Restaurant Pte Ltd third party) [2010]
SGHC 154 and Hygeian Medical Supplies). Thirdly, there were no
relevant public policy considerations that militated against the finding
of a duty of care.
23.68 The first defendant breached its duty of care by instructing the
second defendant to install the WDU at the WDU Area. A reasonable
person would have taken precautions against the leakage of water as the
WDU Area was permeable to water. The first defendant was warned that
the WDU should be installed at a wet pantry area. The engagement of
an independent contractor does not excuse an employer for his own acts
of negligence. In fact, the first defendant went beyond simply engaging
an independent contractor by instructing the independent contractor to
install the WDU at the WDU Area.
23.69 With respect to the claim based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher,
the first defendant argued that if a supply of water is considered a
natural use of land (based on the House of Lords' decision in Transco plc v
Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 which involved
the piping of water to water storage tanks in a block of flats), the
distribution of water within the premises would a fortiori constitute a
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natural use. However, Lai J rejected the argument and opined that it was
necessary to consider the "circumstances under which the dangerous
thing was brought onto the defendant's land": Ho See Jui at [76]; citing
Balfour v Barty-King [1956] 1 WLR 779. In this regard, the learned judge
stated that the "placement of the WDU at the WDU Area, when
combined with the Helical Line Feature and the gradual hydrolytic
degradation of the Water Inlet Hose, made the use of this WDU a non-
natural use of the premises": Ho See Jui at [76]. Though the immediately
preceding statement did not specifically refer to the danger posed by the
use of the WDU, it is likely that Lai J was cognisant of the link between
the increased danger posed and the concept of non-natural use. The
case of Balfour, cited by Lai J (Ho See Jui at [76]), was decided essentially
on the basis that there was a "special user, bringing with it increased
danger to others" ([1956] 1 WLR 779 at 791) [emphasis added]. In this
connection, we also note that the learned judge had already alluded (see
para 23.64 above) to the "potentially hazardous state of affairs" arising
from the placement of the WDU at the WDU Area and the use of the
water inlet hose, albeit in the context of nuisance.
23.70 On the question of apportionment of liability, Lai J held that
the plaintiff was entitled to a joint judgment against both the first
defendant and the second defendant as it was not possible to attribute
the acts of either defendant to distinct portions of the damage suffered
by the plaintiff. The learned judge apportioned the liability between the
defendants inter se at 30% liability to the first defendant and 70%
liability to the second defendant based on the relative contributions of
the defendants to the causes of the damage.
23.71 With regard to contribution and indemnity, Lai J held that the
first defendant was entitled to an indemnity from the second defendant
in respect of its 30% liability due to the second defendant's breach of the
reinstallation agreement. The judge found that the second defendant
had breached implied conditions (satisfactory quality and that supplied
goods are reasonably fit for particular purpose) pursuant to the Sale of
Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed) and that the quotation warning did
not exempt it from liability.
Trespass
23.72 Chia Peng Siang v Attorney- General [2011] SGDC 311 concerned
primarily a claim in false imprisonment and limitation periods. The
plaintiff alleged that the police and the Institute of Mental Health
("IMH") had caused him to be wrongfully imprisoned and had
deprived him of his liberty for three years and three months. The
Attorney- General sought to strike out the plaintiff's claim against the
Government under 0 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5,
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2006 Rev Ed) and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the
grounds that: (a) it disclosed no reasonable cause of action; (b) it was
frivolous and vexatious; and/or (c) it was an abuse of the process of the
court.
23.73 The plaintiff's action was struck out as it was time-barred.
According to s 24 of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed), if the
person to whom the right of action accrued was under a disability, the
time bar is extended to six years from the date that the person ceased to
be under the disability. Assuming that the plaintiff was under a disability
for the entire duration that he was at the IMH, the six years would have
started to run from the date the plaintiff was released on 19 February
2004. Any action commenced on or after 19 February 2010 would be
time-barred. In this case, the plaintiff's writ was filed on 27 December
2010, eight months and nine days too late.
23.74 The Attorney-General had further submitted that the
particulars of wrongful imprisonment in the plaintiff's statement of
claim were factually bare, wholly inaccurate and lacking in specificity.
The plaintiff pleaded in para 9(b) of the statement of claim that the
Mental Disorders and Treatment Act (Cap 178, 1985 Rev Ed) (repealed
on 1 March 2010) ("Mental Disorders Act") "mandated detention only
if the police officer had reason to believe that the Plaintiff is of unsound
mind" However, this was inconsistent with s 32 of the Mental Disorders
Act. Moreover, the pleading in para 9(d) that "[tihe police officers had
lied when they claimed that they had reasonably suspected the Plaintiff
to be of unsound mind" was not supported by particulars as required by
O 18 r 12 of the Rules of Court. Based on the test in Chee Siok Chin v
Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 at 598, the district judge
held it was a plain and obvious case for the court to exercise its power to
strike out as the claim was bound to fail.
23.75 In NIM Minimaart (suing as a firm) v The Management
Corporation Strata Title Plan No 1079 [2011] SGDC 245, the main tort
issues examined related to inducement of breach of contract, conspiracy
and injunction to compel removal of items from premises that were
encroached upon. The plaintiff was a partnership represented solely by
Mr Samba, one of the partners. The first defendants were the
Management Corporation of a condominium development ("MCST").
The second to ninth defendants were members of the MCST's council
with the second defendant, Andrew Lim, as their chairman.
23.76 The plaintiff and the first defendants entered into a licence
agreement with respect to certain premises for the plaintiff's business.
The plaintiff alleged that the first defendants refused to extend the
licence granted to the plaintiff pursuant to the agreement and instead
gave the plaintiff a licence to occupy the premises on a monthly basis,
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and that thereafter, the first defendants ordered the plaintiff to close his
business for about a month, depriving the plaintiff of the use and
enjoyment of the premises and to suffer loss and damage as a result. The
plaintiff also alleged that the second to ninth defendants had wrongfully
induced and procured the first defendants to breach the terms of the
agreement. Further, it was alleged that the second to ninth defendants
unlawfully conspired with each other to drive the plaintiff away from
the premises and/or to damage or destroy his business with the sole or
predominant purpose of injuring the plaintiff. On the other hand, the
MCST sought, by way of counterclaim, an injunction to compel the
plaintiff to remove his goods from the premises and to reinstate the
common property, to pay licence fees or alternatively to pay damages for
trespass.
23.77 The plaintiff was permitted to use the premises to operate a
minimart subject to the terms and conditions set out in the licence
agreement. The duration of the licence or permission granted to the
plaintiff was for a period of two years in the first instance, with the
option to extend the licence for another year subject to revision of the
monthly fee payable. Thus, the agreement could not be construed as
granting the plaintiff an automatic extension of a further year as the
issue of the licence fee payable had to be resolved.
23.78 As the licence granted to the plaintiff for the operation of a
supermarket extended only to the premises and not the common
facilities as described in the licence agreement, any item placed outside
of the premises would have per se constituted an encroachment and
trespass on the common property. The licence agreement specifically
provided that the plaintiff's licence to use and enjoy the common
facilities was limited to gaining access to the premises only and not for
any other purpose. The MCST was thus entitled to require the plaintiff
to remove the items placed on the common property. The plaintiff's
refusal to comply was a breach of the licence agreement.
23.79 With respect to the tort claims, the second to ninth defendants
in their individual capacities were not liable for inducing and/or
procuring the MCST's breach of the licence agreement. The MCST was
not in breach for failure to renew the licence agreement in the first place.
Further, none of the council members had any personal agenda against
Mr Samba. Decisions made by the second to ninth defendants as a body
must be taken as having been made for the benefit of the MCST as a
whole.
23.80 The conspiracy alleged by the plaintiff was merely that the
council members had failed to meet with him despite his repeated
attempts and that they had made a collective decision not to extend the
licence agreement. Conspiracy in tort law comprises conspiracy by
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unlawful means and conspiracy by lawful means. In a conspiracy by
unlawful means, two or more persons combine to commit an unlawful
act with the intention of injuring or damaging the plaintiff, and the act
is carried out and the intention achieved. In a conspiracy by lawful
means, an unlawful act committed by the conspirators is not required
but the plaintiff has to prove a "predominant purpose" by all the
conspirators to cause injury or damage to the plaintiff, and the act is
carried out and the purpose achieved (Quah Kay Tee v Ong & Co Pte Ltd
[1996] 3 SLR(R) 637).
23.81 There was no conspiracy among the second to ninth defendants
to drive the plaintiff away from the premises and/or to damage or
destroy his business. In the instant case, there were no unlawful acts
alleged. The failure to meet with the plaintiff on his terms did not
amount to a conspiracy between the council members either. Even if the
claim were based on a conspiracy by lawful means, there was no
evidence of a predominant purpose on the part of all the council
members to injure Mr Samba. Moreover, the evidence indicated that Mr
Samba was seeking a meeting with the chairman only, and not all the
council members.
23.82 Finally, as the plaintiff's goods and stocks were still at the
premises, the MCST was entitled to an injunction to compel their
removal from the premises. A sum of S$500 was awarded as nominal
damages for the trespass to the premises, as the MCST did not provide
adequate evidence of the market value of the premises at the relevant
time.
Workmen's Compensation Act
23.83 The case of Allianz Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Ma
Shoudong [2011] 3 SLR 1167 ("Allianz Insurance") involved, inter alia,
the interpretation of the words "accident arising out of and in the course
of employment" contained in s 3 of the Work Injury Compensation Act
(Cap 354, 2009 Rev Ed) ("WICA"). The respondents' son worked as a
cabin service assistant delivering food and beverages from the SATS
catering building to aeroplanes. After completing the delivery, the
deceased went to the designated resting area for a short break. He died
from cardiac arrest during the recess.
23.84 The assistant commissioner of labour ("Commissioner") found
that the death had been caused by an accident "arising out of and in the
course of his employment" under s 3(1) of WICA and awarded the
respondents S$140,000 as compensation. The employer's insurers
appealed to set aside the Commissioner's decision. The relevant
provisions of s 3 of WICA are as follows:
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(1) If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment is caused to an employee, his
employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the
provisions of [WICA].
(6) For the purposes of [WICA], an accident arising in the course
of an employee's employment shall be deemed, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, to have arisen out of that employment.
[emphasis added]
23.85 The appellants argued that firstly, the Commissioner was wrong
to have reversed the burden of proof in favour of the respondents.
Secondly, it was contended that the Commissioner reached the wrong
finding of fact, a point relating to the right of appeal under s 29(2A) of
the WICA.
23.86 This case summary deals only with the first ground. The court
noted that once it is proven that the accident arose in the course of
employment, it will be presumed that the accident also arose out of the
employment. Hence, the operation of s 3(6) effects a limited shift of the
burden of proof from the respondents to the appellants by requiring the
employer to show that, although the accident arose in the course of
employment, it nonetheless did not arise out of the employment: Allianz
Insurance at [ 12].
23.87 The cardiac arrest which caused the death was an "accident"
within s 3(1). An accident arose out of the employment if there was a
causal connection between the employment and the accident. A direct
or physical causation is not necessary (Smith v The Australian Woollen
Mills Limited (1933) 50 CLR 504 at 517-518, per Starke J). However, the
accident must have arisen due to some intrinsic risk in the nature of the
employment.
23.88 An accident arises in the course of the employment if it bears a
temporal relationship with the employment (eg, whether the accident
occurs while the employee is at work). Since the cardiac arrest that
killed the deceased occurred while he was resting during work hours,
the accident arose in the course of his employment. Hence, the
Commissioner was entitled to find that pursuant to s 3(6) of WICA, the
burden of proof shifted to the appellants to prove that the accident had
not arisen out of the deceased's employment.
Damages
23.89 Koh Chai Kwang v Teo Ai Ling (by her next friend Chua Wee Bee)
[2011] 3 SLR 610 ("Koh Chai Kwang") concerned the novel award of
provisional damages for loss of earning capacity coupled with the
possibility of the plaintiff applying for loss of future earnings at a later
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date. The appellant's motorcycle collided into the respondent, who
sustained serious injuries including cognitive impairment. If not for the
accident, the respondent would have graduated with a polytechnic
diploma, given her academic results in both her PSLE and "0" Level
examinations. There was sufficient evidence to show that the respondent
would not pass the polytechnic course as a result of her cognitive
impairment.
23.90 The assistant registrar ("AR") awarded the respondent, inter
alia, S$25,000 for cognitive disabilities and S$120,000 for loss of earning
capacity ("LEC") on a 100% basis. On appeal, the High Court judge
increased the award for cognitive disabilities to S$40,000 and replaced
the AR's award for LEC with an award for loss of future earnings
("LFE") of S$492,000. The Court of Appeal had to consider the
following issues: (a) whether it was appropriate to award LFE, and if so,
the quantum; (b) whether the sum of S$40,000 awarded by the AR for
the respondent's cognitive disabilities was excessive.
23.91 On the first issue, in particular the appropriate computation of
LFE, the Court of Appeal stated that the civil service provides a
reasonable career model to base an award of LFE, where the claimant is
a student with a broad range of career opportunities ahead of him or
her and it is unclear which career path he or she will eventually take. In
this case, the respondent also testified that she intended to go into the
food business. The Court of Appeal observed that as the food business
was too broad and uncertain a field, it could not provide a reasonable
model for computation. Thus, the civil service pay scale was to be used
here.
23.92 The Court of Appeal reiterated the principle that LFE and LEC
compensated distinct losses and, therefore, were not strictly alternative
to each other (Chai Kang Wei Samuel v Shaw Linda Gillian [2010]
3 SLR 587). It highlighted that an award of LFE may be made to an
injured party who has yet to enter the employment market "provided
that there are sufficient objective facts or evidence to enable the court to
reasonably make the assessment": Koh Chai Kwang at [38]. However, the
respondent was a data entry clerk at the time of the hearing of the
appeal. Whether this was only a temporary or transitional arrangement
and what her full scope of career options would be were still unclear. In
this regard, pursuant to para 16 of the First Schedule to the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), the court has the (Koh
Chai Kwang at [49):
... [p]ower to award in any action for damages for personal injuries,
provisional damages assessed on the assumption that a contingency
will not happen and further damages at a future date if the
contingency happens ... .
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23.93 Paragraph 16, though modelled on s 32A of the Senior Courts
Act 1981 (c 54) (UK), was drafted more broadly than the English
provisions. Section 32A reads:
(1) This section applies to an action for damages for personal
injuries in which there is proved or admitted to be a chance that at
some definite or indefinite time in the future the injured person will,
as a result of the act or omission which gave rise to the cause of action,
develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in
his physical or mental condition.
23.94 Unlike s 32A of the Senior Courts Act, the "contingency" in
para 16 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act need not be restricted to
a physical or mental condition. The "contingency" could relate to some
other future fact or circumstance, so long as the occurrence of that fact
or circumstance can be objectively determined.
23.95 The Court of Appeal decided to grant a provisional award of
LEC in the sum of S$120,000 and upon the respondent's application for
re-assessment at a later date, a future award of LFE, if any. The purpose
of the provisional damages for LEC was to recognise that "at the
minimum, the respondent's competitive position in the labour market is
weakened by her failure to obtain the Diploma": Koh Chai Kwang
at [54]. An immediate award of LFE would, however, be "highly
speculative": Koh Chai Kwang at [55]. Instead, there would be a further
assessment at a future date when the respondent's employment situation
and prospects become clearer. The prescribed minimum period of time
that has to elapse before an application for further assessment may be
made is four years. This, according to the Court of Appeal, would allow
sufficient time to obtain clarity on the respondent's employment
situation, and to act as a disincentive for malingering. In the interests of
finality, an outer time limit of six years from the date of judgment was
stipulated. Thus, the respondent has a window period of two years to
apply for re-assessment.
23.96 With respect to the computation of the precise contingency, the
career model was utilised to project the likely future income stream of
the respondent but for the accident. The respondent will be taken to
have suffered LFE should her actual monthly income at the time of her
application turn out to be less than 80% of her projected monthly
income. This 20% discount ensures that an application for re-
assessment would be entertained only if the respondent is significantly
prejudiced. Moreover, the job to which the submitted income applies
has to be held by the respondent for a continuous period of at least six
months. Should the respondent earn more than 80% of the projected
monthly income at any point of time prior to her existing job at the
point of application, she should adduce evidence to explain why she was
unable to keep that job or maintain that level of earnings. On the other
Tort Law 463
(2011) 12 SAL Ann Rev
hand, if the respondent were unemployed at the time of her application,
she would have to show that she had been unemployed for a continuous
period of at least six months and adduce evidence to show that she
would be incapable of holding down a permanent job.
23.97 If the respondent is found to meet the above criteria, she should
be awarded past loss of earnings for the period leading up to the date of
re-assessment and LFE for the remaining period after the re-assessment,
with a downward adjustment made for the amount that she would have
already received for LEC. This is because the provisional award of LEC
and the future award of LFE, if any, are derived from "identical
compensatory factors", namely the cognitive impairment and the
respondent's failure to obtain the diploma.
23.98 With regard to the cognitive disabilities, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the judge's award of S$40,000. The Court of Appeal noted that
the respondent had suffered rather significant cognitive disabilities, to
the extent that she had difficulties navigating the polytechnic campus
even with the aid of a map and had failed to graduate with a diploma.
Vicarious liability
23.99 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 540
("Skandinaviska") involved bank fraud by an employee of Asia Pacific
Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd ("APBS") against several banks, including
the two appellants, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ),
Singapore Branch ("SEB") and Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank
Aktiengesellschaft ("HVB"). The employee, who was a Finance Manager
with APBS, had fraudulently obtained credit facilities from the two
banks by deceiving them with forged authorisation documents.
23.100 Both SEB and HVB sued APBS for the fraud of its employee,
arguing that the employee had acted as agent for APBS or that APBS was
vicariously liable for the employee's fraud. In addition, HVB brought an
action in negligence, alleging APBS owed it a duty of care which it had
breached by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent its employee
committing the fraud. SEB brought an action in restitution. The trial
judge found that there was no actual or ostensible authority to ground
an action in agency, and for the same reason held that there was no
vicarious liability. On the negligence claim by HVB, the trial judge
found that there was no duty of care and on the restitution claim, the
trial judge found in favour of SEB. For a discussion of the High Court
decision see (2009) 10 SAL Ann Rev paras 23.100-23.106.
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23.101 The discussion here focuses on the vicarious liability issue. The
appellants had argued in the Court of Appeal that the trial judge should
have applied the close connection test from Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd
[2002] 1 AC 215 ("Lister") instead of relying on the deceit cases of Lloyd v
Grace Smith & Co [1912] AC 716 and Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA
[1986] 1 AC 717, which had a narrower test for vicarious liability. The
respondents argued that the Lister close connection test should be
confined to sexual abuse cases, and alternatively, that even if the close
connection test were applied, it would not justify imposing vicarious
liability on APBS. Chan Sek Keong CJ, giving the judgment of the court,
reviewed the jurisprudence on the close connection test and endorsed it
as the applicable test in Singapore. The close connection test required
courts to consider all the relevant facts and policy considerations to
determine whether it would be fair and just to impose vicarious liability.
23.102 Chan CJ referred to two key policy considerations set out in
John Doe v Bennett [2004] 1 SCR 436, namely, "(a) effective
compensation for the victim; and (b) deterrence of future harm by
encouraging the employer to take steps to reduce the risk of similar
harm in future": Skandinaviska at [76]. Commenting on the first policy
consideration, Chan CJ stated that "a precondition for the imposition of
vicarious liability is that the victim seeking compensation should either
be without fault himself, or be less at fault than the blameworthy party
and/or the ultimate defendant": Skandinaviska at [79]. This seems to
introduce equitable notions of "clean hands" as a policy consideration
for vicarious liability, which is an interesting idea as a counterbalance to
the potential injustice in some cases of making an innocent party
vicariously liable. However, by making it a precondition, and not just a
policy consideration, it would appear that any victim of a tort who is
found to be at least 50% contributorily negligent risks losing the right to
hold the employer of a tortfeasor vicariously liable.
23.103 In applying the close connection test to the facts, the court
referred to the Canadian decision of Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534
("Bazley"), a sexual abuse case where the Canadian court had set out
several factors to determine whether the close connection test was
satisfied. These factors were:
(a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the
employee to abuse his or her power;
(b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have
furthered the employer's aims (and hence be more likely to have
been committed by the employee);
(c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to
friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer's
enterprise;
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(d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in
relation to the victim; and
(e) the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful
exercise of the employee's power.
23.104 The court noted that the Bazley factors were germane to sexual
abuse cases and, not surprisingly, found that the factors were not
applicable to the case. The court then considered the policy factors
that it felt were relevant to the case. The analysis suggests that the
court's approach to vicarious liability is driven primarily by broad
considerations of fairness and justice, rather than narrower
considerations of principle. The four factors identified by the court
were: (a) the absence of a real connection between the tortfeasor's
employment as a finance manager and the fraudulent scheme; (b) the
risk that the finance manager might act fraudulently was not reasonably
foreseeable by APBS; (c) the appellants were not vulnerable victims and
had the capacity to protect themselves, which they failed to do; and
(d) the deterrence argument cut both ways, and in this case there was a
greater need to deter banks than trading companies from taking
financial risks.
23.105 While factors (c) and (d) are defensible, both independently
and within the context of the broader inquiry, factors (a) and (b) raise
some interesting questions. To hold that there is no connection between
a finance manager's employment and financial fraud on the ground that
a financial manager's task is to administer financial matters and not to
authorise financial transactions is to split hairs. More significantly,
factor (b) elides the distinction between direct liability and vicarious
liability. The point about vicarious liability is that it is the relationship
between the defendant and the tortfeasor that grounds the liability, not
any fault, knowledge or foresight on the part of the defendant. The
defendant, in most cases of vicarious liability, would not have engaged
in any blameworthy conduct.
23.106 This blurring of the line between direct liability in negligence
and vicarious liability is highlighted again when the court deals with the
negligence issue (Skandinaviska at [105]):
We earlier stated ... that, conceptually, the 'close connection' test
under the law of vicarious liability is closely related to the Spandeck
test under the law of negligence. In our view, given our ruling that
APBS is not vicariously liable to the Appellants for Chia's fraud
because the fraud was not so closely connected with Chia's
employment as to make it fair and just to impose vicarious liability on
APBS, the court should exercise caution in imposing liability on APBS
under the law of negligence. This is because the 'close connection' test
requires the court to consider, amongst other factors, whether the
tortious acts committed by the employee in the course of his
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employment were foreseeable, and foreseeability is likewise a key
ingredient of liability in negligence ... We see no compelling reason
why the doctrines of vicarious liability and negligence should arrive at
different conclusions in the present case.
23.107 The next vicarious liability case, Chiang Choong Loong v The
Personal Representative of Chua Meng Hwee deceased [2010] SGDC 398
("Chiang Choong Loong") is an example of a very liberal interpretation
of the close connection test. The facts were that the first defendant was
driving a van owned by his employer, the second defendant, when he
smashed into the rear of the claimant's taxi and injured the claimant.
The first defendant died as a result of the accident and the claimant sued
the second defendant, alleging that the second defendant was vicariously
liable for the first defendant's tort. The forensic evidence showed that
the first defendant had been driving at high speed and had not
attempted to stop the vehicle or steer it away to avoid the collision. This
was probably due to the fact that the first defendant was heavily
intoxicated; the toxicology report suggested that his level of intoxication
was at least 3.5 times the legal limit.
23.108 The key issue was whether the second defendant, the employer
of the first defendant and owner of the van, was vicariously liable. The
first defendant, who was employed as a storekeeper and delivery driver,
carried out tasks of collecting and delivering goods during office hours.
A petrol allowance of S$300 per month was provided and the second
defendant permitted the first defendant personal use of the van outside
office hours. The first defendant was responsible for petrol expenses
exceeding S$300 per month and had to pay any fines incurred while
using the van outside office hours.
23.109 Loo Ngan Chor DJ quoted extensively from Lister v Hesley Hall
Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 ("Lister") before framing the key question (Chiang
Choong Loong at [50]), which appears to be based on the second limb of
the Salmond test (Salmond, Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1st Ed
(1907)) at p 83), rather than the Lister test:
Was the deceased's driving the van outside of office hours an act
permitted by the 2nd defendant as part and parcel of his employment,
and, if so, was the deceased's doing so whilst drunk a wrongful mode of
doing the authorised act? [emphasis in original]
23.110 Loo DJ held that the first defendant was "undisputedly
authorised to drive the van outside of office hours because that was a
term of his employment". The fact that he was drunk simply went to
show that it was a wrongful mode of doing an authorised act. This is a
somewhat surprising outcome, particularly in the context of all the facts.
As noted in the judgment, the accident occurred on Tuesday 24 October
which happened to be a public holiday as it was Hari Raya Puasa.
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Monday was a holiday in lieu of Deepavali which had fallen on the
previous Saturday. The last time the first defendant had used the van for
work was on Thursday 19 October. The accident had therefore occurred
at the end of a four-day holiday from Saturday to Tuesday. The time of
the accident is also significant - it was just after 3 o'clock in the
morning. It is difficult to imagine how the first defendant's driving of
the second defendant's van on that fateful occasion could in any way be
closely connected to his employment.
